We have successfully completed our migration to RAM-only VPN infrastructure - Blog | Mullvad VPN
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Today we announce that we have completely removed all traces of disks being used by our VPN infrastructure!

Today we announce that we have completely removed all traces of disks being used by our VPN infrastructure!

  • sixCats@lemmy.dbzer0.com
    3·
    1 year ago

    I’ve never done this, but I believe server network cards can be configured for PXE automatically so

    Bios -> network card -> PXE over network

    So the storage is in the bios config, and then I guess the network card has its own kind of bios?

    • Carlos Solís@communities.azkware.net
      1·
      1 year ago

      So there is still one single damning piece of information stored in the servers after all - the IP address to fetch the PXE boot image from. But hey, if Mullvad finds a way to strip even that out of the servers, that’d be great

        • Carlos Solís@communities.azkware.net
          1·
          1 year ago

          Because by knowing which IP is the boot image stored from, law enforcement can locate the source of the unencrypted image, thus making the scheme lose its privacy. The only way to bypass the issue is by manually configuring the IP after every reboot and keeping it a secret.

            • Carlos Solís@communities.azkware.net
              2·
              1 year ago

              Because by doing so, law enforcement can manipulate the image from the source by:

              • Intercepting the payload and modifying the operative system to send data to law enforcement
              • Pose as the origin of the original payload, and send the tainted operative system to other devices when they reboot

              Unless, of course, the BIOS stores the checksum of the untainted image. (Which adds its own can of worms, because that would make legitimate image upgrades require writing the new proper checksum on each server)